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ABSTRACT
How do states relate to undocumented immigrants and asylum
seekers once they have been formally rejected? A growing amount
of research has been devoted to the role of government and NGO
workers in executing soft-deportation policy through ‘voluntary
return’ programmes. Many of these studies convincingly argue that
voluntary return most often is anything but voluntary. However,
less eﬀort has been spent answering the question of why, then,
departure is still constructed as voluntary and how this
construction is realised in practice. This paper explores the work of
street-level bureaucrats in charge of expelling unauthorised
immigrants from the Netherlands in case expulsion cannot stem
from the law alone and deportation workers deploy extra-legal
strategies to carry out exclusionary policy goals. In these cases, we
show that, in addition to building trust relationships with migrants,
government and NGO workers ostensibly emphasise their clients’
self-determination and agency. By examining the performative
construction of ‘voluntariness’ in highly asymmetrical interview
rituals, this article brings attention to an under-theorised condition
of the conduct of conduct in the era of governmentality: if modern
bureaucratic power, however punitive, must govern primarily by
addressing the freedom of free agents, then it must ensure the
interpretation of conduct as voluntary.
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Introduction
Government treatment of rejected asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants in the
context of return policy has become a major point of contention in European political
conﬂicts over international migration. At the peak of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, in
2015–2016, approximately 93,000 immigrants applied for asylum in the Netherlands.
Forty-four per cent received a negative decision on their request (Ministerie van Veiligheid
en Justitie 2017). However, over the course of 2016 it became clear that most of those who
did not qualify for asylum and were not found eligible to stay in the Netherlands never-
theless would not immediately return to their countries of origin. In April 2017, the Repa-
triation and Departure Service (DT&V) recorded forty-seven per cent of their ‘clients’ as
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having ‘left without supervision’. In practice, this meant that they either had left the Neth-
erlands independently or continued to reside in the country without authorisation.
Should they come into contact with authorities again, these rejected immigrants are
subject to deportation. However, the latter cannot always be eﬀectively enforced, either
because it is legally ruled out by international treaties, or because it is technically impossible.
In those cases, the only remaining option that bureaucrats enforcing migration policy have
at their disposal is seeking to persuade rejected migrants to ‘depart voluntarily’ (Gibney
2008; Webber 2011; Collyer 2012). This article addresses the work of DT&V government
workers and Dutch NGOs who arrange ‘voluntary return’ and provide migrants with
legal counselling. As street-level bureaucrats who are responsible for ‘delivering beneﬁts
and sanctions and structuring and delimiting people’s lives and opportunities’ (Lipsky
1980, 4), return oﬃcers enjoy a large amount of discretion in dealing with legally precarious
migrants (Van der Leun 2006). Classic studies of street-level bureaucracies typically depict
cases in which state agents hold the power to apply the law in a ﬂexible way or decide not to
apply it in order to fulﬁl broader policy goals, reﬂecting a ‘consistent mode of governance in
which discretion and leeway accorded to street-level bureaucrats are necessary for the state
to exert power over citizens’ behaviour’ (Dubois 2014, 40). In the case presented here, the
law is applied to its full extent but is experienced as insuﬃcient to meet the exclusionary
policy objectives assigned to migration bureaucrats. Indeed, DT&V civil servants charged
with expelling unauthorised migrants and rejected asylum seekers soon discover that
formal law only enables them to remove a small minority of people categorised as deporta-
ble. As an alternative to relying onhard state power, such as using coercion or applying sanc-
tions, their work consists in deploying soft-power techniques (Nye 2004) by building close
bonding relationships and foregrounding agentic power and choice to eventually elicit
‘voluntary return’. In particular, both government and NGO workers typically present
undocumented immigrants with limited options to choose from and ensure that, if and
when the departure route is taken, the latter is interpreted by all parties as voluntary.
Many international studies of such programmes convincingly argue that voluntary return
most often is anything but voluntary and show that practices follow a coercive logic geared
towards compulsory return under the ostensible guise of cooperation (Gibney 2008; Andri-
jasevic andWalters 2010; Ashutosh andMountz 2011; Webber 2011; Lietaert 2016; Vande-
voordt 2018). Kalir (2017) and Leerkes, van Os, and Boersema (2017) therefore suggested
that ‘voluntary returns’ can be better conceptualised as ‘soft deportations’. For Leerkes,
van Os, and Boersema (2017, 8) the latter term indicates ‘that such return has deporta-
tion-like properties, while acknowledging that it depends less on force and deterrence’ than
‘classic’ deportations. For Kalir (2017, 57), the concept clearly characterises voluntary return
programmes as ‘an integral part of the overall biopolitical scheme that absolves the territorial
removal of illegalised subjects under state sovereignty’. However, what these studies have
paid less attention to are the processes throughwhich these coerced practices come to be con-
stituted as ‘voluntary’ and interpreted by both parties as a result of migrants’ own ‘agency’
and choice.
By examining the construction of ‘voluntariness’ in these interactions, this article brings
attention to an under-theorised condition of the conduct of conduct in the ‘new regime of
autonomy and choice’ described by Nikolas Rose in Powers of Freedom (1999, 89): that if
modern bureaucratic power, however punitive, regulates conduct by considering agents as
autonomous subjects, this mode of government requires signiﬁcant ideological work in
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order to ensure the interpretation of conduct as voluntary. As we will show in the case of
Dutch return policy, this deﬁnition of the situation is enacted via ‘rituals of freedom’,
during which the ‘clients’ must forcibly perform agency, even though their options are
bounded and geared towards return. The frame of ‘free choice’ does not represent a
mere second best for state agents to use when no forcible option is within reach, as a
purely instrumentalist explanation would have it. Indeed, oﬃcial DT&V policy prescribes
a preference for ‘voluntary return’ over forced removal at any time, including for migrants
who would otherwise easily be deported (DT&V 2015). Although there are obvious bud-
getary, geopolitical and practical reasons for this (Gibney 2008; Collyer 2012), we will
suggest that this state preference for ‘freedom’ as an interpretive trope of conduct also
stems from the broader dynamics of modern governmentality.
Before further analysing government and NGO workers’ practices in the context of
Dutch migration policy, the following section reviews the literature on street-level
bureaucracies and governmentality to emphasise the contemporary role of persuasion
and ‘free choice’ in regulating conduct. Section III presents the legal and geopolitical
factors that render certain undocumented immigrants and rejected asylum seekers
‘non-deportable’ and allow for their continued stay in the Netherlands. This political-
administrative opportunity structure makes ‘voluntary return’ the only available option
for government and NGO workers seeking to obtain departure and informs the interviews
they carry out with migrants. Section IV sets out the policy context through a brief descrip-
tion of the Dutch ‘deportation continuum’ (Kalir and Wissink 2015), emphasising the
twin roles of government agencies and NGOs in executing the country’s return policy.
Section V and VI present the various strategies that return agents apply to elicit ‘voluntary
return’. Most of these techniques involve the scripted performance of agency and self-
determination and seek to ensure that the decision to return ‘voluntarily’ stems from a
shared consensus on ‘free choice’.
Bureaucratic persuasion, freedom and the limits of the law
Inspired by Foucault’s foundational lectures (Foucault 2007), governmentality studies
have long noted that modern power addresses citizens as free agents having to act in
their own interest. Foucault observes
[…] the insertion of freedom within governmentality, not only as the right of individuals
legitimately opposed to the power, usurpations, and abuses of the sovereign or the govern-
ment, but as an element that has become indispensable to governmentality itself. Henceforth,
a condition of governing well is that freedom, or certain forms of freedom, are really
respected. Failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law,
it is above all ignorance of how to govern properly. The integration of freedom, and the
speciﬁc limits [proper to]1 this freedom within the ﬁeld of governmental practice has now
become an imperative (Foucault 2007, 451, emphases added).
Some authors have argued that while this mode of regulation through freedom is mostly
deployed towards citizens, aliens and more precarious denizens are instead primarily the
object of mere discipline. According to Rose, for example:
Strategies for the conduct of conduct increasingly operate in terms of two distinct sectors. For
the majority, expertise operated in terms of the logic of choice, transforming the ways
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through which individuals come to think of themselves, through inculcating desires of self-
development. [...] Yet a minority remain outside this regime of civility (Rose 1999, 88).
For his part, Jonathan Inda borrows from Cruishank (1999) the distinction between ‘tech-
nologies of citizenship’ – by which states aim to moralise citizens framed as inherently
reformable – and ‘anti-citizenship technologies’ aimed at illegal residents viewed as ‘incap-
able of proper self-management’ (Inda 2005, 19–22). By contrast, the case study at the
heart of this article will show that freedom and self-regulation are also key to how the
modern state relates to its legally precarious residents, who thus cannot merely be
described as ‘anti-citizens’ (see Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2012).
Yet, studies of governmentality have been ambivalent about the status and implications
of such ‘freedom’, which has too often been taken for granted. Foucault himself states that
the relation between government and freedom ‘is not exactly, fundamentally, or primarily
an ideology. First of all and above all it is a technology of power’ (Foucault 2007, 71). He
called for a physics of power analysing government ‘as physical action in the element of
nature’ that ‘can only be carried through and by reliance on the freedom of each’. This
naturalisation of freedom as a tool of government potentially opened the way to what
could be described as a ‘behaviourist’ bias in governmentality studies, one that fails to
account for the distinctly ideological component of the social construction of freedom
as freedom. Rose oﬀers a more ambivalent formulation, by stating that freedom is both
a set of practices and an interpretive trope:
The private conduct of free citizens was to be civilized by equipping them with languages and
techniques of self-understanding and self-mastery. Freedom thus becomes linked to a norm
of civility. [...] These practices governed through freedom, to the extent that they sought to
invent the conditions in which subjects themselves would enact the responsibilities that com-
posed their liberties (Rose 1999, 72, emphases added).
Whether the ideal of ‘self-mastery’ reﬂects reality or pertains to ﬁction, understanding
agency as agency requires a ‘language’ and thus ideological work. In contrast to most of
the governmentality literature, this article will speciﬁcally study the social construction
of freedom in the process of governing non-citizens’ conduct. In the case of ‘voluntary
return’, undocumented migrants must be persuaded to leave by themselves and convinced
that the decision stems from their own choice. This requires the use not of raw force but of
incentives that purport to make the desired behaviour objectively sensible and hence inter-
pretable as the product of ‘agency’. Rejected migrants must decide to leave ‘in their own
interest’ (Volkskrant, October 30, 2015).
This article also expands the scholarship on bureaucracies and the interaction between
street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980) and their ‘clients’. Most studies imply that bureau-
crats’ power stems from their ability to apply the law or not, or to choose between diﬀerent
ways of implementing it, in order to govern the behaviour of their ‘clients’. In contrast, this
article brings attention to cases when the government of behaviour cannot stem from law
or discretion alone and street-level bureaucrats need to deploy ‘extra-legal’ strategies as a
policy instrument on a permanent basis (Fatovic and Kleinerman 2013).
These strategies are well known to scholars studying police interrogations in the United
States, where ‘third degree’ tactics (torture) were oﬃcially prohibited following the Wick-
ersham report in 1931. Later, in its 1966 Miranda v. Arizona decision, the Supreme Court
established the right to remain silent and the right for suspects to be informed of the
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opportunity to consult with an attorney before and during questioning. In particular,
under the Miranda v. Arizona ruling, it was decided that the refusal to confess and incrimi-
nate oneself may never itself constitute a punishable oﬀense. Following these civil rights
decisions, the recourse to coercive methods by police interrogators to elicit confessions
was extensively restricted (Leo 1992; Shuy 1998; Thomas and Leo 2012). Since then, the
law has required that a confession be completely voluntarily, or it may be excluded
from admission into evidence at trial (Ofshe and Leo 1997). As it is not in a person’s inter-
est to admit guilt and as coercive methods of physical force, torture or incommunicado
interrogation are no longer legal – although they have by no means disappeared (The
Guardian, January 28, 2016) –, interrogators have developed methods of psychological
coercion to provoke ‘free’ confession (Ofshe and Leo 1997). Among others, these softer
forms of coercion include the strategic use of persuasion to induce admissions and con-
fessions. The police oﬃcer will emphasise the merits of admitting guilt and convince
the suspect that it is in his or her own interest to collaborate with authorities (Kassin
and McNall 1991; Leo 1992, 1996).
The speciﬁc techniques put forward in this example show how street-level bureaucrats
make their ‘clients’ comply when the execution of policy may only stem from voluntary
compliance. Taking return policy as a case study, the empirical sections of the paper
focus on techniques that Dutch migration bureaucrats deploy in similar situations,
when their ‘clients’ are ordered to leave the Netherlands, but forced removal cannot be
carried out and ‘voluntary return’ programmes appear to civil servants as the only remain-
ing option. The next section ﬁrst explains under which speciﬁc circumstances these
‘clients’ are rendered ‘non-deportable’.
The making of migrant non-deportability
Nicholas De Genova (2002, 439) coined the term deportability to name a universal con-
dition shared by noncitizens, which implies ‘the possibility of being removed from the
space of the nation-state’. Although any unauthorised immigrant is theoretically subject
to expulsion by the state, in practice not everyone can be forcibly relocated to their
country of origin. As a consequence, the majority of undocumented immigrants continue
to stay within the boundaries of the receiving nation-state, while the Sword of Damocles of
deportability hangs over them. Yet, the degree to which undocumented immigrants are
produced as practically deportable or non-deportable varies depending on time and
space (Paoletti 2010; Rosenberger 2014).
Non-deportability often stems from the reluctance of origin states to cooperate on
forced return. Indeed, deportation always requires the willingness of another state to
accept the returnee (Gibney 2008). In 2016–2017, when the research for this article
took place, several countries such as Morocco, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan refused to
cooperate with the Dutch government on forced removal. In international law, a
country is obligated to take its own nationals back. Before that, nationality must be estab-
lished (Broeders 2010). Often, however, documentation linking an individual to a particu-
lar state is not available. Indeed, immigrants in the Netherlands and other receiving
countries frequently have recourse to identity stripping, i.e. ‘shed[ding] their legal identity
to escape the state’s reach’ (Ellerman 2010, 424), whether by throwing their passports or by
erasing their ﬁngerprints and thus physically mutilating themselves.
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In cases where papers or ﬁngerprints have been destroyed, government oﬃcials attempt
to determine identity through other means. The ﬁrst way nationality can be established is
by presenting the ‘client’ at embassies of likely countries of origin, where the state consul
may or may not decide whether the migrant is a citizen of their country. Thus government
oﬃcials frequently go ‘embassy shopping’ in the hope of establishing a migrant’s nation-
ality (ibid., 416). If accepted by an embassy, travel documents must then be acquired. For
all countries of origin, government workers, NGOs or immigrants themselves must ask for
a temporary laissez-passer. For countries reluctant to cooperate on forced removals,
embassies often do not issue these documents unless requested by migrants themselves
through in-person visits. In some cases, states can circumvent this legal constraint by cov-
ertly deporting migrants to countries without a functioning government through crafting
the travel document themselves. This substitute travel document, in Dutch the Europees
Reisdocument, has made deportations to countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia poss-
ible, for example. However, for the vast majority of countries to which unauthorised
migrants are repatriated, this indirect option is not available to the Dutch government.
Moreover, there are ways for ‘clients’ to eﬀectively delay or cancel their deportation pro-
cedure from the Netherlands, even if travel documentation is available. Rejected immi-
grants are often assisted by NGOs in acquiring temporary legal status. Various medical
conditions may allow them to claim temporary residency, until they are declared ‘ﬁt’ for
return to their home countries. Amongst others, pregnancy (Castañeda 2008) or severe
illness (Ticktin 2006) might result in a temporary Artikel 64 permit and eﬀectively delay
the process of deportation from the Netherlands. Immigrants who manage to acquire
these temporary residence permits are therefore neither regular nor irregular, but solely
documented, ‘recognised and tolerated but not legally authorised’ (Rosenberger 2014, 8).
Likewise, government workers are responsible for checking undocumented immigrants’ eli-
gibility for legal procedures protecting victims of human traﬃcking and other ‘exceptional
circumstances’. Initiating such a procedure may postpone deportation for up to three years.
This is, however, not the case regarding requests for family reuniﬁcation. During ﬁeldwork,
we encountered the situation of an irregularly staying Guinean woman, who was consider-
ing such an application with her Dutch boyfriend. Although she regularly discussed this
with her caseworker, and despite her possible eligibility for legal stay, the ‘voluntary
return’ procedure continued and eventually resulted in her removal to Guinea.
Finally, restrictions on the use of detention can also hamper deportation. In the Nether-
lands, an assistant prosecutor must decide whether an undocumented immigrant may be
placed in detention for up to six months. Instead, lighter and less stringent measures are
typically imposed, one of which is a duty to report to a government worker every few
weeks to discuss the return process. A forty-ﬁve-year-old male civil servant responsible
for this reporting requirement complained that, according to him, the DT&V held less
control over unauthorised immigrants who ‘autonomously’ came to his desk than over
those in detention, adding that his organisation was ‘at risk of losing its clients since
they can disappear into illegality once the prospect of return becomes more concrete’.
Taking the abovementioned factors into consideration, variation in non-deportability
shapes the options available to government and NGO workers responsible for enforcing
‘return’. Indeed, street-level bureaucrats typically estimate if they are faced with a ‘promising
case for voluntary return’ and subsequently adjust their strategies and interviewing tech-
niques. These strategies stem from the so-called ‘track-policy’ (Sporenbeleid) which the
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Dutch government introduced in 2015 as a measure to deal with what they considered an
excessive amount of asylum applications. The new policy’s ﬁrst and second tracks set accel-
erated procedures for people who fall under the Dublin system (track 1), come from ‘safe
countries of origin’ or have legal status elsewhere in Europe (track 2). These migrants are
likely to receive a negative decision on their asylumclaim and are ordered to leave theNether-
lands within 30 days. Migrants falling into one of these two tracks are often placed in deten-
tion quickly after the initial DT&V interviews, so long as travel documentation is available.
Even these migrants deemed ‘easy to deport’ are informed about ‘voluntary return’,
however, while being warned of the consequences of non-cooperation. A forty-two-
year-old female caseworker at the limited-movement facility in Ter Apel explained to
us: ‘If someone in this category shows a willingness to return voluntarily, we will look
at the possibilities and contact IOM or other organisations’. Certain categories of ‘easily
deportable’ migrants were clearly granted more leeway and time than others to arrange
for their voluntary return. This was the case with families, elderly migrants and other
persons classiﬁed as particularly vulnerable. The case of a sick, elderly woman from
Georgia, interviewed by a thirty-one-year-old female caseworker during our ﬁeldwork,
highlighted this practice. Even though the Georgian woman originated from a safe
country of origin and a laissez-passer was already available to the DT&V, the caseworker
commented: ‘given that she is severely ill and IOM can provide her with additional money
if she wishes to return, I grant her extra time to make the necessary arrangements’. Thus,
even some rejected migrants whom return oﬃcers thought were good prospects for forci-
ble removal were oﬀered the possibility of returning ‘voluntarily’.
Return policy and the Dutch deportation continuum
Approximately 10,000 unauthorised migrants are repatriated every year from the Nether-
lands, either forcefully or ‘voluntarily’ (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2017). About
500 government employees work at the organisation responsible for removal, the DT&V.
A large proportion of them are so-called ‘caseworkers’, whose job is to interview their
‘clients’, unauthorised immigrants, on a regular basis. The interviews may last from ﬁve
minutes up to two hours, depending on the complexity of the case, and mainly emphasise
the prospect of return. In addition to the DT&V, the Aliens Police, the Central Organ for
the Reception of Asylum Seekers and the RoyalMarechaussee also hold important roles in
the Dutch ‘deportation regime’ (De Genova and Peutz 2010) by either tracing undocu-
mented immigrants, managing temporary facilities where they are housed or ensuring
their physical departure from the Netherlands.
Next to government caseworkers, an extensive ﬁeld of civil-society organisations,
including volunteers and paid workers, assist undocumented immigrants in legal pro-
cedures, acquiring shelter and arranging return. We follow Vandevoordt (2018), Kalir
and Wissink (2015) and Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn (2017) in designating as
street-level bureaucrats not only government workers, but also certain types of NGO per-
sonnel. The latter are in direct contact with undocumented immigrants, exert a high level
of discretion and grant access to government programmes, such as sponsored return
schemes or the Bed, bad en brood shelter programme. There is great variety in the
types of non-governmental organisations, ranging from those that can be regarded as gov-
ernment subcontractors, to those operating in agreement with the state, to organisations
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that oppose and challenge state policies (Kalir and Wissink 2015). Kalir and Wissink
(ibid., 2) argue that these two seemingly opposing parties – the government and NGOs
– can better be conceptualised as a continuum that is ‘underlined by a dominant logic,
common categories, shared political subjectivities and pre-agreed lines of political
actions’. The DT&V, NGOs and international organisations indeed often collaborate
within ‘voluntary return’ programmes to ‘meet the needs’ of ‘clients’ who have been sum-
moned to leave the Netherlands. These programmes are often carried out through the
International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM) larger ‘Assisted Voluntary Return
and Reintegration’ scheme, which provide participants with ﬁnancial and in-kind assist-
ance, ranging from paying for ﬂight tickets to providing for documentation, medical
assistance, formal education and funds for ‘reintegration’ (Ashutosh and Mountz 2011).
Additionally, several local NGOs provide training and equipment, oﬃcially to encourage
returnees to start a business or enhance ‘reintegration’ in the country of origin.
To explore the deportation continuum and strategies government and NGO workers
deploy to incite undocumented immigrants to return to their origin countries, Laura
Cleton conducted participant observation and interviews in several Dutch municipalities
in the ﬁrst half of 2017. On the government side of the continuum, she spoke to over thirty
government employees working at various locations, including asylum seekers’ reception
centres, limited-movement facilities, detention centres, family locations and regular
oﬃces. On the civil society side of the continuum, actors who participated in the research
included both salaried and voluntary workers at eighteen diﬀerent NGOs. These NGOs
were scattered along the spectrum theorised by Kalir and Wissink (2015). The diﬀerent
types of NGOs included in the study covered organisations providing shelter in various
municipalities, organisations providing counselling and support for undocumented immi-
grants in legal procedures and organisations focussing on providing vocational training in
preparation for return.
To study street-level bureaucrats’ strategies, we used a wide range of methods that
included direct and participant observation and formal and informal interviewing. We
collected data on strategies of government workers during a total of eleven working
days at ten diﬀerent locations of the DT&V with various actors. During a typical
working day, Laura immersed herself into the government workers’ daily routines and
informally interviewed them on issues such as strategies, views on deportation and their
experiences of executing the tasks of a DT&V employee. Concurrently, she joined govern-
ment workers during interviews with undocumented immigrants, canteen lunches and
meetings with more senior colleagues. This enabled us to retrieve ﬁrst-hand observations
on interactions with undocumented immigrants as well as discussions among colleagues
on various strategies they believed that they should follow when dealing with speciﬁc cases.
In the NGO sector, Laura conducted eighteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with
twenty workers, which ranged from ﬁfty minutes to two and a half hours. These interviews
dealt with their daily activities, strategies and approaches towards undocumented immi-
grants and their views on state return policy.
All informal interviews and observations at the DT&V were processed into observation
reports. The semi-structured interviews with the NGOworkers were all recorded and tran-
scribed. All material received the consent of the respondents and approval for usage.
When interviews are quoted, no names of individuals or NGO organisations are
mentioned.
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Emotional bureaucratic labour
Street-level migration bureaucrats deploy a range of soft coercive strategies in order to
obtain the return of undocumented immigrants. Among those is establishing trust
relationships on a personal level (Khosravi 2009; Volkskrant, October 30, 2015). In
2014, the DT&V introduced a new interviewing method for its employees that rec-
ommends bonding with migrants as a core strategy (Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek, 19
May 2017). Government employees must actively build a connection with their ‘clients’
and engage with their lives, forming what Khosravi (2009, 45) in the Swedish case has
called a ‘human relationship’. The oﬃcial DT&V manual (DT&V 2015) describes an out-
right ‘game’ in which ‘some employees use charm, others use humour or provide structure
to motivate clients to talk’. In practice, caseworkers often ask about family members in the
country of origin, inquire about their ‘clients’ health conditions, or joke about their
language skills (‘you speak Dutch very well, you do not need a Farsi translator any
longer!’). Moreover, caseworkers ostensibly acknowledge the diﬃcult situation their
‘clients’ ﬁnd themselves in and exhibit empathy while listening to the stories they tell.
Processes of managing relations and displaying and regulating emotions have famously
been conceptualised by Arlie Hochschild (1983) as ‘emotional labour’. Hochschild shows
that service workers are expected to regulate their emotions during interactions with custo-
mers in accordance with employer expectations. In the case of the bureaucratic labour of
migration-related agencies, employees are invited to establish what the DT&V calls a
‘working alliance’ (werkalliantie) with their ‘clients’ as they arrange for their return
(Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek, 19 May, 2017). The DT&V manual recommends that ‘the
caseworker apply techniques to steer and inﬂuence clients, so as to eventually stimulate
the foreigner towards an independent decision to return’ (DT&V 2015, 18, emphasis
added; see also Khosravi 2009, 45). This strategymay involve having recourse to a casewor-
ker of the same national origin, following the principle of ‘native counselling’ (Leerkes, van
Os, and Boersema 2017). A ﬁfty-six-year-old female DT&V employee working at the Schi-
phol detention centre said that, for her, the central component of interviewing ‘clients’
entails engagingwith their personal stories and looking for leads bywhich they could be trig-
gered to think about going back to their countries of origin. She did this, for example, by
eliciting fond memories of the home country or bringing attention to family members
that were left behind there and who the returnee would be able to meet again.
Through this ‘working alliance’, government workers are encouraged to engage with
undocumented immigrants on a deeper level and become acquainted with their hopes
and fears. Hochschild (1983) distinguishes between two diﬀerent types of employee
emotional labour. The ﬁrst, surface acting, involves a ‘faking process’ through which the
expression towards ‘clients’ is altered, but internal feelings and emotions are left intact,
resulting in what Hertoghs (2012) calls ‘strategic empathy’. Government workers at the
DT&V perform surface acting when they display compassion towards their ‘clients’
stories while simultaneously adhering to restrictive state policy. A sixty-two-year-old
male DT&V employee, for example, resorted to surface, tactical empathy in his interview
with a Kurdish woman from Iraq. The woman told the civil servant about her sick mother
and experiences with human traﬃckers in Turkey. He nodded and told the woman he
understood her situation. Immediately afterwards, however, he explained the process of
requesting a laissez-passer at the embassy to send her back to Iraq, since her passport
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was missing. When the woman started crying and claimed that she could not return since
her life would be in danger, he did not respond and instead told her: ‘I assume this means
you do not want to cooperate on return. In that case, I will make a note in your ﬁle, since
you are violating an obligation stated in Dutch law’, knowing that this paved the way for a
possible forced return procedure in the future.
In deep acting, by contrast, employees themselves alter their internal feelings to align
more with expectations, which in the end might produce more genuine emotional dis-
plays. Contrary to classic service-sector companies analysed by Hochschild, agencies in
the deportation continuum are not primarily at the service of their ‘clients’. Yet, DT&V
guidelines indicate that, should the caseworker display ‘openness and aﬀection to empha-
tically show involvement with the client’ (2015, 19), bonding will result in ‘true goodwill to
work with the foreigner’. When the abovementioned DT&V employee at the Schiphol
detention centre gave an overview of her ‘clients’, she almost exclusively called them
‘schatjes’ (darlings), said she often exchanged her personal phone number with them
and that she used her spare time to ‘read about [their] cultures to better understand
why they come to the Netherlands’. Other caseworkers often made references to their
own lives during DT&V interviews ‘to, on the one hand, show that I talk about my
own experiences and share personal stories, but also to increase [my client’s] doubts
about staying by evoking the prospect of being reunited with her husband [in her
country of origin]’ (forty-two-year-old female DT&V employee).
Whether acting remains the ‘surface’ kind or turns ‘deep’ varies greatly across individ-
uals and situations and is not easy to determine (see also Vandevoordt 2018). At the
DT&V, deep acting may require employees to convince themselves that their ‘clients’
would be safe if returned to their origin countries. In many ways, it requires believing
in the original assessment made by the Dutch government, so that emotional bonding
with ‘clients’ never comes into contradiction with their employer’s exclusionary policy
objective (Kalir and Wissink 2015). By contrast, NGO personnel generally have more
leeway to present options that are not bound by return, so that in their case deep
acting does not require believing that the initial government decision is well founded.
For NGOs that are heavily funded by the Dutch government, however, deep acting
might be as ideologically demanding as for DT&V workers, since their funding depends
on the eﬀective removal of rejected migrants.
In other cases of deep acting, bonding with ‘clients’ may create tension with govern-
ment goals and lead return agents to start doubting whether they may or may not be
doing the right thing. In their study of Swedish immigration detention centres, Puthoop-
parambil, Ahlberg, and Bjerneld (2015) analysed this conﬂict between one’s feelings and
the established rules and protocols in terms of emotive dissonance. In our ﬁeldwork, for
instance, a male government employee in his late ﬁfties working at a family location
explained that his ‘working alliance’ with families and underage children has turned
him from a ‘rechtse rakker’ (right-wing conservative) to a ‘softie’, potentially at odd
with his organisation. He mentioned that ‘after twenty-six interviews with the same
client, a relationship inevitably starts growing and it often gets very personal as well.
That is how I would describe the relationships I have with my clients: involved and per-
sonal’. Due to these ‘personal’ relationships, DT&V caseworkers sometimes assist in regu-
larisation eﬀorts made by NGOs in favour of the migrant or may question whether the
immigration services (IND) really made a ‘correct’ and ‘humane’ decision in rejecting
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their application. In order to suppress these feelings, government workers must convince
themselves that it is ‘not their job’ as DT&V employees to judge the credibility of other
agencies in the Dutch government. As we will see, they may also emphasise the individual
responsibility ‘clients’ have for their own fate.
Emotional labour does not stop at the door of the interview room, however, nor is it
limited to dyadic bureaucrat-migrant relationships. Indeed, it is not only caseworkers
and their ‘clients’ who are addressed through these interviews: the broader public is also
convoked in the social construction of voluntary return. Through a set of audio-visual
material available on DT&V and some NGO websites, bureaucratic labour hence
expands into public emotional labour, through which readers and watchers are informed
about procedures and methods deployed by caseworkers to obtain ‘voluntary’ return.
These materials consist of documentaries, explanatory videos, collections of stories on
day-to-day experiences and newspaper articles introducing interviewing techniques. The
involvement of the wider public in emotional labour is thus part and parcel of voluntary
return schemes.
We report: providing ‘honest’ information
One of the key recommendations for the establishment of a ‘working alliance’ and the
eventual construction of a ‘voluntary return’ decision is to provide rejected migrants
with ‘honest’ information about their rights and the regulations in place in the Nether-
lands. Legal procedures are often complicated and while most undocumented immigrants
have attorneys, both NGO and government workers spend a lot of time discussing the
diﬀerent procedures and possible routes with their ‘clients’ as well (DT&V 2015).
Return agents typically have a double agenda in ‘explaining’ these procedures, as they
also use interviews as an opportunity to have undocumented immigrants contemplate
return. Government oﬃcers frequently use sentences such as: ‘Have you already been
thinking about what you are going to do if your appeal is declined?’ or ‘If you do not
leave the Netherlands within twenty-eight days after your appeal is declined, you will
be in the Netherlands illegally: is that what you want?’. ‘We tell them that they should
understand that the bed, bad, brood is not forever, and ask them what they themselves
are doing to shape their own future’ explained a twenty-two-year-old female NGO
worker. ‘Information’ and threat are often intertwined. Two civil servants said that they
do not hesitate to tell their ‘clients’ that they will soon be put in detention or deported.
By doing this, they hope that their ‘clients’ will ‘take matters in their own hands’ and envi-
sage returning. ‘If you do not come up with a plan B, in four weeks, we will book a ﬂight to
Kabul for you and you and your family will leave forcefully’, one of them warned during an
interview with a couple from Afghanistan with two children, ‘is that what you want?’.
The very prospect of legalisation may ironically be deployed as a strategy to encourage
voluntary return as a pre-condition for new entry through legal routes. During one
observed interview, a ﬁfty-six-year-old female DT&V employee kept encouraging one
of her ‘clients’ to continue the process of family reuniﬁcation with his Dutch wife and
emphasised the need for him to return to Morocco to apply for an entry visa. She did
not go into detail about the requirements and practicalities of the new legal procedure
when she talked to him. She later clariﬁed that ‘in the end, our goal is to return people
to their country of origin. It does not matter to me that, if he… once he is back in
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Morocco… applies for a new visa and possibly comes back to the Netherlands. My goal is
reached, and if he is eligible for legal stay in the Netherlands, he has the right to do so’.
Most often, providing ‘honest’ information involves inventorying obstacles and other
sources of reluctance that stand in the way of returning. Promising a sum of money con-
vinces some rejected immigrants to consent to departure. Others prefer to be able to ﬁnish
an education they started, get business training or receive in-kind assistance (Koch 2014;
Lietaert, Broekaert, and Derluyn 2017; Collyer 2018). Some government workers research
possible job opportunities back in countries of origin. Others recalled printing out docu-
ments for new procedures after oﬃce hours. Others never do anything extra, however,
since ‘[undocumented immigrants] are not meant to be in the Netherlands anyway’
(male DT&V employee in his forties).
Despite these behavioural diﬀerences, all government workers and NGO personnel
emphasise undocumented immigrants’ decision-making power and ‘responsibility for
their own future’. This is most clearly visible in so-called ‘empowerment trajectories’
oﬀered by NGOs, that ‘try to ensure that rejected migrants take back control of their
own lives and start deciding what is best for them’ (twenty-eight-year-old female NGO
worker). The DT&V manual also provides plenty of cues that signal the importance of
interpellating the ‘client’s’ agentic power. According to the principles laid out in the
DT&V manual, caseworkers preferably are to be thought of as ‘coaches’ who provide
moral support and underscore the importance of an independent decision (DT&V
2015, 51). In a return interview described in the Dutch press, one DT&V agent addressed
a ‘client’ by proclaiming: ‘together, we can clear all the obstacles that stand in the way of
return, but you are the one making the change’ (De Correspondent, 17 March 2014). The
next section examines the implications of invoking ‘choice’ and ‘agency’ in the service of
the institutionally predeﬁned objective of return.
You decide: choice and agency
Indeed, central to soft-power strategies to ensure the departure of rejected immigrants
is the emphasis on agency. Two civil servants interviewed together claimed that pro-
viding diﬀerent options to their ‘clients’ and underscoring the choices they have at
their disposal makes ‘voluntary’ return more likely. In their interactions with migrants,
they lay out the diﬀerent pathways their ‘clients’ can follow, although the range of
choices is bounded by the latter’s formal obligation to leave the Netherlands. Once
the various options are on the table, they explain, it is up to the ‘client’ to ‘decide’
what his or her future will look like and how return will take place. In a meeting
with a twenty-year-old Albanian man, a forty-one-year-old male civil servant warns:
‘either you cooperate with us and we will make sure that you can leave for Albania
voluntarily… but if you disappear and choose to live with your aunt illegally, you
risk being arrested and forcefully deported’.
Commenting on an analogous process in the Swedish deportation regime, Khosravi
(2009, 46) describes how this ‘social conversation gives an illusory sense of power and
self-determination’. In the Dutch case as well, return oﬃcers repeatedly present undocu-
mented immigrants as being in charge of their own future and emphasise their decision-
making power. During ﬁeldwork, a thirty-seven-year-old senior male DT&V employee
interviewed a man from Myanmar who expressed reluctance to go back to his country,
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but defeatedly said that he would comply with what the DT&V tells him to do. The civil
servant then answered that ‘it does not matter what the DT&V wants you to do, but what
you yourself want to do, since you are the one making decisions’. Another female DT&V
employee interviewed a nineteen-year-old Moroccan man who told her that he felt like
he kept going around in circles, and that he had no other option than to stay in the Nether-
lands, since he has a duty to care for his mother back inMorocco. She visualised this endless
circle on a piece of paper and told him: ‘you are running around like this [in circles] right
now, but until you make an eﬀort and decide to break away [pencil leaving the circle] you
will stay stuck where you are now. You need to think about what you want’.
From the start, however, it is clear to state employees that the ultimate goal is to govern
‘clients’ toward return and that the only two real options are ‘voluntary return’ or deporta-
tion (Koch 2014; DT&V 2015; Walker 2018), delineating what Lietaert (2016) calls ‘con-
strained choice’. As a DT&V caseworker also suggests: ‘We are strict and helpful at the
same time. The message they get is: you need to return, and how can we assist you with
that?’ (Volkskrant, April 15, 2014, emphasis added). In the United Kingdom, this dis-
course on free choice has become even more restrictive as, since 2014, the Home Oﬃce
has removed the option of leaving ‘voluntarily’ from detention centres. Whereas in the
Netherlands, ‘voluntary return’ can take place at any time during the return procedure,
the Home Oﬃce recently declared that ‘AVR [Assisted Voluntary Return] is not a last-
minute alternative to removal and should be a considered decision’: it thus must
happen prior to detention (quoted in Walker 2018, 6, emphasis added). If rejected
migrants refuse to take ‘responsibility for their own fate’ and make a ‘voluntary’ request
prior to being detained, they are seen as ‘non-compliant’, ‘illegal’ and ‘undeserving’ of pri-
vileges such as ‘voluntary return’ (Walker 2018, 8). In Belgium too, the period during
which migrants are allowed to apply for AVR has become shorter and there are now
more beneﬁts for those who decide to return early on in the procedure (Lietaert, Broekaert,
and Derluyn 2017). Rejected migrants therefore have to want to return ‘voluntarily’, and
they must prove it: to varying degrees, this paradoxical logic of forced choice, which
unmasks the disciplinary nature of ‘freedom’ as a government tool by bringing it to its
extreme, seems to have become a central feature of European migration regimes. Such
practices are also at play in the Netherlands, not on paper or through restricted access
to voluntary return programmes, but through the ritualistic performance of ‘agency’ in
return conversations, where migrants are required to express their choice as a result of
their own decision power. Hence, choice is not just ‘forced’ through limited options,
but also because migrants have literally no choice but to choose.
Ultimately, the routine invocation of choice also reminds the ‘client’ of the violent set of
unequal domestic and international power relations that generates the situation of
urgently ‘having to choose’, while naturalising these power relations as undebatable.
Repeatedly summoning migrants to express their choice and conﬁrm whether they
‘really’ want to stay in the Netherlands is hence an integral part of the ritual construction
of their spatial illegitimacy and out-of-placeness.
Conclusion
Based on qualitative interviews and ethnographic observation in the Dutch deportation
continuum, this article details the techniques return agents and agencies have developed
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to obtain the relocation of rejected migrants to their purported countries of origin while
having this departure interpreted as ‘voluntary’.
Of great importanceduring return interviewswas the emphasis placedon ‘agency’ and ‘free
choice’. Althoughmany scholars have rightly pointed out that ‘voluntary return’ is, in fact, far
from voluntary (Webber 2011; Koch 2014; Kalir 2017; Lietaert, Broekaert, andDerluyn 2017;
Vandevoordt 2018), this paperwas speciﬁcally interested in the institutional and interactional
processes through which ‘voluntariness’ is socially constructed and becomes ‘real in its con-
sequences’ (Thomas 1928). In particular, we paid attention to procedures by which return
agents seek to instil in their ‘clients’ a sense of being in control over their own lives and of
making independent decisions.We analysed these concerns in the spirit of Foucault’s lectures
on governmentality, arguing that this speciﬁc mode of governance through freedom extends
to the deportation continuum and thus does not stop at solely regulating citizens. However,
governing through freedom implies having to construct individual decisions as ‘free’. This
article showed that return interviews thus functioned as heavily scripted ‘rituals of
freedom’ involving the forced performance of agency bymigrants. Interestingly, the function
of those rituals in the deportation process does not seem to be so much that of imposing the
actual belief in freedom, in a psychological sense, as that of installing free choice as the domi-
nant deﬁnitionof the situation.Whethermigrants actually believe in the ritual appears tobeof
secondary importance, as the truth it imposes is not located in individual minds but in the
interaction order and the migration regime that structures it.
One might think that this bureaucratic insistence on ‘voluntary return’ only occurs in
cases where deportation is deemed outright impossible and is thus but a way of making a
virtue out of a necessity. However, as we saw, in the Netherlands the ‘voluntary’ option is
also oﬀered to deportable migrants, at least initially – the forcible removal procedure is
only initiated once they refuse. Indeed, the DT&V instructs its employees that it is ‘worth
the eﬀort to motivate every foreigner to cooperate’ since this ‘can strongly contribute to a
digniﬁed, thoughtful and timely return’ (2015, 36, emphasis added). Of course, even
when available, coercion is generally resource-intensive, risks unleashing public opposition
and is also often constitutionally restrained. But practical concerns and cost-eﬀectiveness
are only part of the explanation and governmental insistence on ‘voluntariness’ also illumi-
nates the centrality of freedom as a mode of legitimate government in liberal states (cf.
Gibney 2008), even in the presence of more coercive alternatives, and however ﬁctitious
that freedom turns out to be. More comparative research would be needed to determine
whether the disciplinary eﬀects of the invocation of ‘freedom’ in the case of voluntary
return stand in contrast to more genuine and empowering deployments of the language
of freedomwhen applied to full citizens. Or, on the contrary, whether the symbolic violence
of freedom in the deportation apparatus points to a deeper and more inconvenient truth
about broader citizenship technologies, whomever they apply to. At a minimum, by
making free choice the new emblem of better government, neoliberal governmentality
has become so pervasive that it now imposes its rhetoric even on ostensibly illiberal situ-
ations, ultimately turning the latter into dubious masquerades of freedom.
Note
1. The English edition erroneously writes ‘the speciﬁc limits to this freedom’. We ﬁxed the sen-
tence based on the French edition, which, for this paragraph, is an exact verbatim of the
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original recording of Foucault’s French-language lecture given at the Collège de France on
April 5th, 1978: ‘L’intégration des libertés et des limites propres à cette liberté à l’intérieur
du champ de la pratique gouvernementale, c’est maintenant devenu un impératif’.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Celine Cantat for her generous comments on an earlier version of this
paper, presented at the ECPR-SGEU Conference at Science Po, Paris, 13–15 June 2018. We more-
over beneﬁted from Madeleine Arenivar and Hannah Goldwyn Simpkins’ readings of a draft
version of this paper. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to three anonymous reviewers
and JEMS editors for their detailed and thought-provoking comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Andrijasevic, Rutvica, and William Walters. 2010. “The International Organization for Migration
and the International Government of Borders.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space
28 (6): 977–999.
Ashutosh, Ishan, and Alison Mountz. 2011. “Migration Management for the Beneﬁt of Whom?
Interrogating the Work of the International Organization for Migration.” Citizenship Studies
15 (1): 21–38.
Broeders, Dennis. 2010. “Return to Sender? Administrative Detention of Irregular Migrants in
Germany and the Netherlands.” Punishment & Society 12 (2): 169–186.
Castañeda, Heide. 2008. “Paternity for Sale: Anxieties Over ‘Demographic Theft’ and Undocumented
Migrant Reproduction in Germany.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 22 (4): 340–359.
Chauvin, Sébastien, and Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas. 2012. “Beyond Informal Citizenship: The New
Moral Economy of Migrant Illegality.” International Political Sociology 6 (3): 241–259.
Collyer, Michael. 2012. “Deportation and the Micropolitics of Exclusion: The Rise of Removals
From the UK to Sri Lanka.” Geopolitics 17 (2): 276–292.
Collyer, Michael. 2018. “Paying to Go: Deportability as Development.” In After Deportation:
Ethnographic Perspectives, edited by Shahram Khosravi, 105–125. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cruishank, Barbara. 1999. TheWill to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. New York:
Cornell University Press.
De Genova, Nicholas P. 2002. “Migrant Illegality and Deportability in Everyday Life.” Annual
Review of Anthropology 31 (1): 419–447.
De Genova, Nicholas P., and Nathalie Peutz. 2010. The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space and
the Freedom of Movement. Durham: Duke University Press.
Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek (DT&V). 2015. Methodische Handleiding DT&V: Werken in
Gedwongen Kader. Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie: Den Haag.
Dubois, Vincent. 2014. “The State, Legal Rigor, and the Poor: The Daily Practice of Welfare
Control.” Social Analysis 58 (3): 38–55.
Ellerman, Antje. 2010. “Undocumented Migrants and Resistance in the Liberal State.” Politics &
Society 38 (3): 408–429.
Fatovic, Clement, and Benjamin A. Kleinerman. 2013. “Introduction: Extra-Legal Measures and the
Problem of Legitimacy.” In Extra-legal Power and Legitimacy: Perspectives on Prerogative, edited
by Clement Fatovic, and Benjamin A. Kleinerman, 1–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 15
Gibney, Matthew J. 2008. “Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom.”
Government and Opposition 43 (2): 146–167.
Hertoghs, Maja. 2012. “Emotions and the Legal Construction of Truth: an Ethnographic Study of
the Dutch Asylum Procedure.” (Master’s Thesis). University of Amsterdam.
Hochschild, Arlie. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Inda, Jonathan X. 2005. Targeting Immigrants: Government, Technology, and Ethics. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Kalir, Barak. 2017. “Between ‘Voluntary’ Return Programs and Soft Deportation. Sending
Vulnerable Migrants in Spain Back ‘Home’.” In Return Migration and Psychosocial Wellbeing:
Discourses, Policy-Making and Outcomes for Migrants and Their Families, edited by Zana
Vathi, and Russel King, 56–71. Abingdon: Routledge.
Kalir, Barak, and Lieke Wissink. 2015. “The Deportation Continuum: Convergences Between State
Agents and NGO Workers in the Dutch Deportation Field.” Citizenship Studies 20 (1): 34–49.
Kassin, SaulM., and Karlyn R.McNall. 1991. “Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communication
Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication.” Law and Human Behavior 15 (1): 233–251.
Khosravi, Shahram. 2009. “Sweden: Detention and Deportation of Asylum Seekers.” Race & Class
50 (4): 38–50.
Koch, Anne. 2014. “The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of UNHCR and IOM
in the Governance of Return.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (6): 905–923.
Leerkes, Arjen, Rianne van Os, and Eline Boersema. 2017. “What Drives ‘Soft Deportation’?
Understanding the Rise in Assisted Voluntary Return among Rejected Asylum Seekers in the
Netherlands.” Population, Space and Place 23 (8): 1–11.
Leo, Richard A. 1992. “From Coercion to Deception: the Changing Nature of Police Interrogation
in America.” Crime, Law and Social Change 18 (1): 35–59.
Leo, Richard A. 1996. “Inside the Interrogation Room.” The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology
86 (2): 266–303.
Lietaert, Ine. 2016. “Perspectives on Return Migration: a Multi-Sited, Longitudinal Study on the
Return Processes of Armenian and Georgian Migrants.” (PhD Dissertation). University of Ghent.
Lietaert, Ine, Eric Broekaert, and Ilse Derluyn. 2017. “From Social Instrument to Migration
Management Tool: Assisted Voluntary Return Programmes – The Case of Belgium.” Social
Policy & Administration 51 (7): 961–980.
Lipsky, Michael. [1980] 2010. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie. 2017. Rapportage Vreemdelingenketen. Periode Januari-
December 2016. Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie: Den Haag.
Nye, Joseph S. 2004. “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy.” Political Science Quarterly 119 (2):
255–270.
Ofshe, Richard J., and Richard A. Leo. 1997. “The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and
Irrational Action.” Denver University Law Review 74 (4): 979–1122.
Paoletti, Emanuela. 2010. “Deportation, Non-Deportability and Ideas of Membership”. Working
Paper Series No. 65. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre.
Puthoopparambil, Soorej J., Beth M. Ahlberg, and Magdalena Bjerneld. 2015. “‘It is a Thin Line to
Walk on’: Challenges of Staﬀ Working at Swedish Immigration Detention Centres.”
International Journal of Qualitative Studies on Health and Well-Being 10 (1): 1–11.
Rose, Nikolas. 1999. Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rosenberger, Sieglinde. 2014. “After the Deportation Gap: Non-Removed Persons and Their
Pathways to Social Rights”. Paper Presented at the European Social Science History
Conference, Vienna, April 23–26.
Shuy, Roger W. 1998. The Language of Confession, Interrogation and Deception. Thousand Oaks:
Sage Publications.
Thomas, William. 1928. The Child in America: Behaviour Problems and Programs. New York:
Knopf.
16 L. CLETON AND S. CHAUVIN
Thomas, George III, and Richard A. Leo. 2012. Confessions of Guilt: From Torture to Miranda and
Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ticktin, Miriam. 2006. “Where Ethics and Politics Meet: The Violence of Humanitarianism in
France.” American Ethnologist 33 (1): 33–49.
Van der Leun, Joanne. 2006. “Excluding Illegal Migrants in The Netherlands: Between National
Policies and Local Implementation.” West European Politics 29 (2): 3010–326.
Vandevoordt, Robin. 2018. “Judgement and Ambivalence in Migration Work: On the
(Dis)Appearance of Dilemmas in Assisting Voluntary Return.” Sociology 52 (2): 282–297.
Walker, Sarah. 2018. “Detention and its Discontents: Punishment and Compliance Within the U.K.
Detention Estate Through the Lens of the Withdrawal of Assisted Voluntary Return.” Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1443805.
Webber, Frances. 2011. “How Voluntary are Voluntary Returns?” Race & Class 52 (4): 98–107.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 17
